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Since the publication of Elinor Ostrom’s seminal book “Governing the Commons” (1990) 
much analytical attention is paid to the collective governance of land and resources.2 Research 
conducted in this vein shows that common pool resources – resources characterised by rivalry 
in consumption and high exclusion costs – can be sustainably governed by their users. 
Hardin’s famous metaphor of “the tragedy of the commons” has been proven to be a rather 
particular case amongst many others (Ostrom 2007). Scholars advance certain conditions 
suggesting the cases in which collective governance of common pool resources is likely to be 
successful. Among them are clearly defined boundaries of the resource and the ability of its 
users to defend these boundaries against outsiders (Ostrom 2005a, 259, 262). As Dietz, 
Ostrom, and Stern (2003; my emphasis) summarise “locally evolved institutional 
arrangements governed by stable communities and buffered from outside forces have 
sustained resources successfully for centuries (…).” Although the aforementioned article is 
titled “The Struggle to Govern the Commons” (ibid), an analysis of how and under which 
conditions resource users are able to achieve this “buffer from outside forces” is missing. This 
is a puzzling omission, given the manifold examples of dispossession of smallholders from 
economically valuable (common pool) resources. Eviction of rubber tappers in Brazil and 
their subsequent struggle for recognition of their claims to resources by the state is one among 
the well-documented examples (Almeida 2002). Vulnerability of smallholders “does not just 
fall from the sky” (Ribot 2009), neither does its opposite. Analyses of common pool resource 
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governance omitting these processes run the risk of producing a truncated account of what is 
at stake when smallholders are to become rights holders over resources.  
 
Consequently, there are calls to broaden the analysis of common pool resource governance. 
Some call for a more explicit treatment of the role of power within well-established analytical 
frameworks in governance research (cf. Mwangi and Markelova 2009), yet others argue for a 
different perspective on the question. Sikor (2006) and Mollinga (2007), for example, 
advance a relational approach to the analysis of common pool resource governance. Property 
rights scholars have long pointed out that property is not a thing but a set of relations between 
members of a society and an object (Von Benda-Beckmann 1995, 312) or benefit stream 
(Bromley 1991, 15). Further, property is about legitimised claims to a resource by one user 
that become institutionalised in property rights relations (cf. Sikor and Lund 2009). In the 
absence of such legitimised claims to land or other natural resources, actors nevertheless 
access resources. Or they even do so in disrespect of legitimised claims. Ribot and Peluso 
(2003) distinguish property as “the right to benefit from things” from access understood as 
“the ability to benefit from things.” They distinguish further agents who control access from 
those who maintain access through the former. Agents may control access because of 
preferential access to authority, control over market access, or by ownership over other 
tangible resources such as financial capital. In many cases, establishing secure rights for 
smallholders to land and other natural resources requires remoulding the relations between 
smallholders, other agents and the state. This implies politicising the term governance (cf. 
Borras Jr and Franco 2010), as it relates to the distribution of land and power in rural 
societies. 
 
The analysis of rural social relations and their change is the hallmark of agrarian change 
scholarship.3 Building on the insights offered by this school, the paper argues that an agrarian 
change perspective yields valuable insights into common pool resource governance. Insights, 
which often go unnoticed in studies on collective action for communal resource governance 
(see, for example, Ostrom 1990). The paper builds on case studies on land rights 
regularisation initiatives located in Western Pará in the Brazilian Amazon. These initiatives 
are characterised by (i) the recognition of property claims of smallholders to land and forest 
resources; and (ii) conflicts between these smallholders and other agents (principally, loggers 
and ranchers) over access to the resources. Hence, land rights regularisation in these cases 
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involves a redistribution of access. To understand the process of agrarian change the paper 
advances a conceptual map of power (section 2). The subsequent section 3 briefly introduces 
the methodology followed. Section 4 describes case study findings. Presentation of findings 
follows phases of land rights regularisation: mobilisation for land rights regularisation, taking 
the struggle to other fora, and momenta of responsiveness by the responsible public organ. 
The process of agrarian change is then analysed from the perspective of power (section 5). 




2 Establishing Rights to Resources: A Question of Power 
 
Borras and Franco (2010, 22f) distinguish three cases of contemporary contexts of agrarian 
reform. First, there is radical social change associated with electoral victories of political 
parties that represent marginalised segments of society. The election of Evo Morales as 
president of Bolivia and its implications for Bolivia’s indigenous peoples’ land rights might 
count as a recent example. Second, “everyday politics” of the poor can alter national level 
policies (Tria Kerkvliet 2006). Both are rare cases. The third case is much more frequent, in 
which “the rural poor and their allies are confronted by the challenge to change their situation 
with the very structures that perpetuate their problematic conditions” (ibid, 23). Agrarian 
reform is not in a deadlock, however. Democratic transitions, the gender struggle (Deere and 
León 1997), or the increased leverage of national and international Non-Governmental 
Organizations (Borras, Edelman et al. 2008) all create space for agrarian change (on the 
changing conditions of agrarian reform, see Herring 2000). Environmental discourses allow 
some to cast their property claims in terms of environmental protection. This framing 
increases the resonance of their requests (on the unintended consequences, see Medina, 
Pokorny et al. 2009). A conceptual map to understand power in processes of agrarian reform 
needs to reflect these various ways power is created. This is not to replace a structural-
relational understanding of the power – as it is often adopted in agrarian change scholarship – 
with a voluntaristic approach but a complement to it.  
 
A principal challenge to such an endeavour is the question of commensurability (cf. Clegg, 
Courpasson et al. 2006, 218f). Therefore, a conceptual map that attempts to incorporate 
different conceptualisations of power needs to establish a common point of reference. 
Haugaard (2003), for example, advances a framework developed from a post-modern 
perspective. It takes the reproduction of meaning as its point of departure and derives a 
framework of “seven ways of producing power” from there. The quest for a commensurable 
frame to combine different theories of power need not be an elusive one.  
 
The paper adopts a different approach that derives its assumptions from the philosophical 
school of Critical Realism (cf. Archer, Bhaskar et al. 1998). One of the key concerns of 
critical realist philosophy (and social theory) is a reflection of causality.4 While the subject is 
debated within Critical Realism, key proponents share the following convictions. A 
conceptualisation of causality, which establishes causality by identifying regularities between 
events, is rejected (so called “successionist view of causation” or Humean account of 
causation). Instead they suggest asking “(…) what an object is like and what it can do and 
only derivatively what it will do in any particular situation” (Sayer 1992, 105). That is they 
assume a “generative view of causality” (cf. Ekström 1992). Social entities, discourses,5 
social structures, or institutions possess causal powers in their own right, which are not 
reducible to the agents. These entities co-exist and concurrently exert their influences. A 
particular event is contingent upon other social entities with their causal powers. Take the 
example of landless people staging a demonstration in front of the ministry of agrarian 
reform. The effects of this public act might depend on the party affiliation of the minister and 
his or her key staff, receptive officials within the administration, ongoing relations with 
international donors, or the availability of allies pressuring for agrarian reform. The paper 
advances that a commensurable conceptual map of different sources of power is possible by 
looking at the social entities, which possess the causal powers to produce events. This is not 
to reify social structures. Social entities other than the agent exercise their influence through 
the agent. They do not act by themselves. Related to this is the question of whether power is 
an agency or a structural concept (cf. Mosse 2004). From the perspective advanced here, only 
agents hold the capacity to act. However, the sources of agential power also originate from 
other social entities. Three social entities are considered here: individual agents with their 
particular causal powers, discourses and ideas, and institutions.6 
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There are at least three important implications to this assumption of causality. First, power is 
a capacity not its exercise. To have the capacity to act is to have the power to do something. 
This includes the capacity to get others to do something they would otherwise not do (power 
over), but it is not exhausted by it (cf. Lukes 2005, 73f).  Second, understanding the dynamics 
of common pool resource governance requires a “thick description” of the process, as it is an 
empirical question, which causal properties interact in changing governance (see section 3). 
Third, analyses of common pool resource governance need to take into account the pre-
existence of social structures and institutions to individual actions. “As individuals we are 
born into a set of structures that are not of our making” (Hodgson 2000b, 11). Hence, it is 
necessary to go beyond methodological individualist approaches in explaining institutional 
change in resource governance. 
 
If the analysis of institutions and social structures assumes such importance how do they 
shape agents’ differential scope for action?7 Two processes stand out: the allocation of social 
positions within social structures and the inducement of habitual behaviour. Within social 
structures agents obtain certain capacities to act that they would not possess, if they would not 
inhibit this particular social position. Property rights are a case in point. They allocate two 
social positions with regard to an object or a benefit stream. One agent, A, obtains the position 
of the rights holder, the other agent, B, gets allocated the correlated position of a rights holder. 
Through the institution property right agent A acquires the right to obtain benefits from an 
object. In the absence of this institution, agent A might not be able to obtain these benefits as 
other agents may benefit from this object by, for example, using force. The allocation of 
social positions within social structures not only contributes to creating social order. It might 
also lead to a situation in which some agents are put in a marginalised social position. Think 
of gender roles discriminating against a particular sex or norms stigmatising certain groups in 
society. To turn the argument around, some agents also achieve social positions, which 
significantly enhance their capacities to act. Think of, for example, members of the agrarian 
elite. The web of social relations in which they are embedded often allows them to obstruct 
progressive redistributive policies (cf. Kuhnen 1982, 338; Angeles 1999).  Hence, social 
positions capacitate some agents to pursue particular actions and at the same time constrain 
others agents’ scope of action. 
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 “Institutions are systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social 
interactions” (Hodgson 2006, 18; emphasis in original). Ongoing exposure to constraints 
associated with particular institutions gives rise to habitual behaviour of agents (Hodgson 
2007a). Habits can be defined as “the propensity to behave in a particular way in a particular 
class of situations” (Hodgson 2004, 652). They are particular ways of acting that agents 
acquire in the process of socialisation. Habits are inscribed in agents’ tacit knowledge, 
knowledge that one cannot easily “put into words” (Haugaard 2003, 100). A focus on 
socialisation, habits, and tacit knowledge allows retaining the core of Lukes’ idea of “false 
consciousness” while avoiding the problem of outsiders determining what agents’ real 
interests are (ibid, 101).8 The existence of habitual behaviour draws attention to processes that 
might lead to the unconscious reproduction of institutions. Martha Nussbaum’s work on 
gender provides compelling evidence. “Even when women appear to be satisfied with such 
customs, we should probe more deeply. If someone who has no property rights under the law, 
(…), who will very likely be beaten if she seeks employment outside the home, says that she 
endorses traditions of modesty, purity and self-abnegation, it is not clear that we should 
consider this the last word on the matter” (Nussbaum 2000, 42f).9 In short, habitual behaviour 
can be a significant source of disempowerment. 
 
Institutions and social structures are not the only social objects that influence agent’s power, 
agent’s capacity to act. Discourses matter (cf. Arts and Buizer 2009). First, discourses 
influence how agents construct meaning (Fairclough, Jessop et al. 2002, 6f). The meaning 
attached to institutions is essential for sustaining them (cf. Searle 2005). So, discourses shape 
agents’ capacities to mould institutions regulating access to land and other natural resources 
by facilitating or inhibiting processes of institutional change. Of course, agents hold the 
capacity to critically reflect on discourses and their influence on institutions by asking for 
reasons (cf. Bromley 2006). However, even if agents identify reasons for institutional change, 
there is no guarantee that their “giving of reasons” will alter discourses on institutions and 
institutional change. Their giving of reasons is more likely to become embedded in 
discourses, if they refer to other texts in the discourse (intertextuality) and other well-
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established discourses (interdiscursivity) (Phillips, Lawrence et al. 2004, 644f). Summing up, 
“discourses make certain ways of thinking and acting possible, and others impossible or 
costly” (ibid, 638). 
 
Together, the causal effectiveness of institutions, social structures, and discourses emphasise 
the complexity of factors influencing changes in common pool resource governance. This is 
not to do away with agential powers of deliberation or agents cognitive or physical capacities. 
Agents own a “prospective” capacity to imagine and other futures and formulate paths to 
attain it (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). The presentation of sources of power highlights, 
however, that there are other sources of agents’ power to change institutions of common pool 




3 Understanding Institutional Change: A Note on the Research 
Approach 
 
In order to understand the manifold influences on processes of institutional change it is 
necessary to adopt a research approach that allows for openness. Research on which this 
paper draws followed a case study approach, defined as “a way of organizing social data so as 
to preserve the unitary character of the social object being studied” (Goode and Hatt 1952 in 
Blaikie 2000, 215; emphasis in original). I followed a comparative case study approach (Yin 
2003, 46ff), each case being a land rights regularisation initiative (see table 5-1). Four of these 
already led to the formal recognition of smallholders’ claims to land and forests. Despite of its 
formal creation, I do not consider the PDS Ademir Federicci as a case, in which land rights 
regularisation was achieved. Fieldwork revealed that as of September 2008 none of the 
intended beneficiaries was settled in the area. The RESEX Renascer was decreed after my 
fieldwork had already ended. In this case, I obtained additional information on the process of 
reform after 2008 via telephone interviews with my research partners in Pará. All agrarian 
reform initiatives are located in so called frontier regions in Western Pará.10 Case study 
selection criteria are: (i) recognition of smallholders’ claims leads to a re-distribution of 
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access to land and other natural resources and (ii) those benefitting from the status quo contest 
the implementation of the forest tenure reform initiative. 
 
Land Rights Regularisation Initiative Municipality 











  Not created Medicilândia 48.58 
Renascer Extractive 
Reserve 














1 290 000 2500 2004 Porto de Moz 68.57 
Table 5-1: Overview over the case studies. 
 
Data was collected during three field visits, which took place from 2006 – 2008 and in total 
10 months of field presence. Principal research methods applied are interviews (open-ended 
questions, which aimed at generating narratives), which I recorded, participant observation, 
and participatory research exercises (primarily, participatory mapping). My interview partners 
were inhabitants of the areas subject to reform, their Brazilian civil society partners, 
representatives of national NGOs, Brazilian researchers, and public officials. I conducted 69 
interviews, of which I led roughly 80% with representatives from the first two categories of 
interview partners. Civil society groups played a crucial role in organising my field access. 
Therefore, they have an important gatekeeper function. The gatekeeper function influenced 
access to different groups within the agrarian reform initiative. In effect, I often found it more 
difficult to interview those who have closer ties with those agents opposing reform. During 
my stays I worked, as far as possible, together with the civil society groups. The participant 
observation mainly draws on these insights. Based on the findings obtained during the second 
field visit, I developed first explanations during the first phase of data analysis (which 
consists of data classification). Then, during my third field visit, I discussed these fist 
tentative explanations with my research partners. Based on these discussions, I developed 
more specific explanations. I used secondary sources, to augment the empirical basis of my 
research. 
 
The first step in data analysis comprised of the paraphrase of the statements of my interview 
partners remaining true to the language they used. In the next step, I produced case study 
reports in which I classified the data according to themes (e.g., agents and their access 
strategies or forest tenure reform process). In a subsequent step, I applied codes to the data 
that allow for a fine-grained classification of parts of the data, which I then related to the 
conceptualisation of power.  
 
Concerning the analysis of habitual behaviour, I build on the “Documentary Method” as 
presented by Bohnsack (2003b) and Nohl (2006). A key premise of the methodology is 
agent’s inability to give an account of his or her tacit knowledge that underpins habitual 
behaviour. Tacit knowledge needs to be reconstructed. The term “comparative sequence 
analysis” captures the core of the “Documentary Method.” “Sequence analysis” refers to the 
insight that interviews giving an accord of a particular course of action exhibit the regularities 
that underpin agent’s (in this cases, interview partner’s) habitual knowledge. Hence, 
responses stand in a meaningful relation to each other that can be reconstructed by analysing 
the sequence of the statements. Comparison of one sequence with sequences of other 
respondents on the same topic allows reconstructing each agents’ “frame of orientation” 
(Orientierungsrahmen). This “frame of orientation” is the tacit knowledge that gives rise to 




4 Struggles for Recognition: A Review of Five Cases in Western  
Pará 
 
The settlement history of Western Pará is long. Besides several indigenous tribes (populações 
indígenas) who inhibit the area, settlers moved to the Amazon during earlier economic booms 
such as the extraction of natural rubber at the beginning of the 20th century. Even though these 
economic activities often became economically unattractive, settlers remained and 
accommodated their lifestyle to their environment. Subsistence agriculture and extractive 
activities form the basis of these so called traditional people (populações tradicionais). The 
proverb “God is great but the forest is greater” (Deus é grande mas a mata é maior) captures 
the necessity to adapt ones lifestyle to the Amazonian environment that those early settlers 
experienced. The proverb’s validity expired when military government’s from 1964 onwards 
initiated a colonisation scheme for the Amazon. Besides concern for the integrity of Brazil’s 
borders, the military regime intended to ease pressure by social movements for agrarian 
reform in the Northeastern and Southern parts of the country by opening up the Amazon for 
“agrarian reform” and colonisation (Ianni 1979, 47f). A settlement programme replaced 
redistribution of agricultural land in areas characterised by highly unequal land distribution. 
Government also attracted private investments principally in cattle ranching, by providing, for 
example, subsidised credit (cf. Binswanger 1991). Whereas the support for smallholders soon 
ceased, enterprises or large-scale producers continued to receive Government support 
(Treccani 2001, 184). The newcomers to the region did not start on an equal footing. 
Nevertheless, the spontaneous settlement by landless people continues up to the current day 
(cf. Fearnside 2008). The colonisation programme which fundamentally shaped Pará’s social 
and environmental development from the 1970ies onwards implied different relations 
between the State on the one hand and smallholders and large agricultural producers on the 
other hand.  
 
Although the smallholder population, which is at the core of this article (small settlers and 
traditional people) do not hold title to the land they live on their settlement is not illegal. 
Brazilian legislation establishes that people can settle on unclaimed public land. If they live 
on the land and cultivate it (cultural efectiva and moradia habitual) for a year and a day, they 
acquire the right to land through its appropriation (direito de posse). In Western Pará, the size 
of the plots claimed by smallholder families is 100 hectares. To turn posse into a title a legal 
process applies (regularisation of posse). Generally, this process is difficult to follow for a 
smallholder family forcing them to live without regularisation of their land by the state. 
Needless to say, that this process does not pose much of a constraint to better-capitalised 
agents (Foweraker 1981, 112f).  
 
When Western Pará experienced a further inflow of logging companies and large ranchers 
from the 1990ies onwards, the recognition of smallholders’ rights to land and the resources on 
it by the state was not very advanced. Infringements of smallholder’s rights and land conflicts 
ensued (cf. Sauer 2005). Withdrawal of logs from smallholders’ lands without their consent 
and expulsion of smallholders from their lands are some of the consequences (cf. Treccani 
2001). The municipalities covered by this paper are no exception in this regard. This situation 
gave rise to attempts by the smallholders and affiliated social movements to regularise 
smallholders’ posse.  
 This struggle for recognition implies that smallholders inhabiting the area subject to 
regularisation need to agree on a particular modality to regularise their land. Brazilian 
legislation foresees a wealth of options for land rights regularisation. Modalities differ among 
other things with regard to whether titles are given to a collective or individuals or whether 
smallholders actually obtain the right of alienation (for an overview over the options, see 
Carvalheiro, Treccani et al. 2008). Next, smallholders need to closely follow up on their 
request, as the responsible agencies usually do not have the capacity to address all the claims 
(ibid). Smallholders need to establish ties with the administration at state or federal level to 
push their claims forward. Lastly, the respective agency needs to take a decision on the 
request and start taking steps to regularise smallholders’ land. The following description of 
the land rights regularisation process – the process of establishing property rights to land – 
follows these three broad steps.  
 
4.1 Municipal Politics: Mobilising for Institutional Change 
 
Mobilisation for institutional change involves activities such as land literacy or assistance to 
the founding of community organisations. Those arguing for land rights regularisation within 
the municipalities had to confront two principle challenges. One, they had to raise awareness 
on the long-term impact of the prevailing land use practices on livelihoods in a social context 
often characterised by dependency relationships between loggers or ranchers and 
smallholders. Second, they had to operate in a municipal political context strongly influenced 
by the very same actors whose land use strategies infringed upon smallholders’ lands. Under 
these conditions, mobilisation for institutional change followed varied pathways in the five 
case studies. First, section describes these different trajectories and then, second, turns to the 
strategies of the proponents of and the opponents to land rights regularisation. The latter part 
will allow an analysis of the challenges encountered during mobilisation for land rights 
regularisation. 
 
In the late 1990ies pressure on smallholders’ lands increased substantially in Porto de Moz. 
At that time, the social movements of Porto de Moz could already look back on a history of 
resistance to other agents appropriating resources pertaining to the communities. At the 
beginning of the 1980ies, the fishing grounds in Porto de Moz increasingly became the target 
of so called “geleiras.” Geleiras are fishing vessels equipped with ice (gelo) to allow storing 
fish. In comparison with the amount of fish caught by communities, the size of the caught by 
geleiras was significantly higher. Depletion of fishing stocks resulted, which negatively 
influenced the livelihoods of the traditional people for whom fish forms an essential part of 
their diet. Catholic priests sympathising with liberation theology played a vital role in this 
resistance as the “Comunidades Eclesiais de Base” organised by them served as a starting 
point for political mobilisation of the communities. This opposition finally led to the creation 
of fishing accords (acordo de pesca) stipulating rules for fishing. The accords prohibit, inter 
alia, access by the geleiras to the fishing ground regulated by the accord. By the end of the 
1980ies and towards the beginning of the 1990ies, timber extraction intensified. Principally 
from the municipality of Breves small loggers arrived which began opening up logging roads 
in the forest. This practice led to land conflicts, which in turn created the first demand to 
protect the land against intrusion. At the beginning of the 1990ies, communities demarcated 
four so called community areas (áreas comunitárias) to protect land and the natural resources 
located on it. These community areas never obtained legal recognition by state agencies, 
however.  
 
A high degree of involvement of various social movements and members of the communities 
affected by illicit resource use practices characterise the case of Porto de Moz. An example is 
the broad participation in the several seminars on natural resource use in the municipality of 
Porto de Moz, which were held in 1995. As well in the mid-1990ies, the Committee for 
Sustainable Development in Porto de Moz was founded. It serves as an umbrella organization 
for the community associations of the municipality. The committee even receives external 
financial support by the German Development Service (DED). When the pressure on land and 
forest resources intensified, the social movements organised what became known as the 
“Fechamento do Rio.” Disappointed by the lack of response by state agencies on their several 
claims to halt illegal resource use, a decision was taken to make their claims being heard. 
From September 19 to September 21, 2002, smallholders from Porto de Moz and social 
movements of the region blocked the river Jauruçu. Greenpeace provided support to the 
“fechamento.” This river served as the principle exit route for timber that was illegally 
withdrawn in the area that is now the RESEX Verde para Sempre. As an effect of this 
blockade, several boats transporting illegally cut timber were intercepted and reported to the 
federal environmental agency IBAMA. National media covered the “fechamento” increasing 
its outreach. 
 
The situation with regard to mobilisation is very different concerning the Sustainable 
Development Project (projeto do desenvolvimento sustentável, PDS) “Ademir Federicci.” On 
the one hand, organised civil society is less diverse in Medicilândia than in the other cases. 
The key entity is the Rural Workers Union (sindicato dos trabalhadores rurais, STR). Its 
members hold diverging positions regarding the implementation of the land rights 
regularisation scheme. There are those who actively strive for land rights regularisation 
through the envisioned modality of a Sustainable Development Project. In 2008, when 
fieldwork ended, they hold a minority position. Those who are sceptical to its realisation 
focus on the settlement aspect of the PDS. They advance that it is difficult to settle people in a 
region distant to the municipal capital, as service provision will be very costly. Access roads 
are of poor quality and difficult to use in the rainy season. The needs of the traditional people 
already living in the area were not equally reflected in their accounts. A member of congress 
of Brazil’s Workers Party, who is closely allied with the heads of the STR, supports this 
sceptical view. Further, the church – a strong supporter of RESEX implementation in the case 
of Porto de Moz – is less involved in the land rights struggle. The few members of the STR 
working for the implementation of the STR need to shoulder the time consuming and costly 
work of raising awareness alone. On the other hand, the people already living in the area 
subject to future land rights regularisation were not well informed on the process or the 
implications of the envisioned modality. Discussions sometimes even revealed lack of 
awareness that there is a process of land rights regularisation underway.  
 
Moving further north to the municipality of Prainha and the RESEX Renascer, the situation is 
again different. When the first proposal for the creation of the RESEX Verde para Sempre 
emerged, the two RESEX were proposed as one connected area. Contrary to the original 
proposal, only the RESEX Verde para Sempre was decreed in 2004. The discussion of the 
original proposal contributed to awareness raising and mobilisation in general. In 2007, about 
80% of the population of the RESEX Renascer had already voiced their desire for the creation 
of the RESEX during the meetings with IBAMA. The land rights regularisation process 
receives strong support from the rural labour union of Prainha. Further, a representative 
organisation for the communities living in the area covered by the RESEX was founded 
Catholic priests in Santarém provide further support to mobilisation. In comparison to the 
case of the PDS Ademir Federicci, support by social movements for mobilisation of 
smallholders rests on a broader alliance of entities. Leading representatives of the social 
movements in Prainha unequivocally supported the land rights regularisation initiative. 
 As the case of the RESEX Renascer, the RESEX Riozinho do Anfrísio forms part of a larger 
proposal covering an area called “Terra do Meio.” The term Terra do Meio refers to a region 
roughly located between the highway BR – 163 in the west and the river Xingu in the east. It 
covers about 7,9 million hectares in the municipalities of Altamira, São Felix de Xingu, and 
Trairão. About 80% of the area is located in the municipality of Altamira. Indigenous lands 
boarder the Terra do Meio in the South, the North, and the North-East. Their demarcation 
dates back to the beginning of the 1980ies. Their demarcation was a response to invasions by 
loggers extracting mahogany. Later, these indigenous lands provided some protection of the 
Terra do Meio as they made access to the area more difficult. Towards the end of the 1990ies, 
the Terra do Meio suffered from more invasions leading to an increase in the number of land 
conflicts. To address this situation a broad alliance of social movements began to reflect on 
possible solutions to these threats to smallholder livelihoods. Among others, the alliance 
comprised the Pastoral Land Commission, the prelacy of the Xingu, the FVPP (an umbrella 
organisation for several social movements in the region of the Transamazon Highway and the 
Xingu). The Brazilian NGO Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) provided further support. The 
result of the ensuing discussions was a proposal to create a mosaic of conservation units 
(mosáico das unidades de conservação). A fully elaborated study on this mosaic 
commissioned by the federal ministry for environment was finalised in 2003. In the case 
Riozinho do Anfrísio the decision in favour of the modality RESEX rather reflects the 
discussions of the aforementioned agents. Mobilisation of the communities was limited before 
the process of land rights regularisation began. The proposal to create a RESEX was then 
discussed with the respective communities living in the area. Some communities claim that 
they were not consulted in the discussion process. Despite of this neglect the majority of the 
smallholder families living in the area supported the RESEX proposal when IBAMA 
conducted the study necessary for RESEX’s implementation.  
 
Similar to the case of Verde para Sempre, the social movements of Anapú could look back to 
a long history of striving for recognition of peasant’s property claims when the struggle to 
create the PDS began. The colonisation plans for the Amazon designed under military rule 
distinguished two types of areas. One in which settlement schemes for landless settlers are to 
be implemented and the other destined for large agricultural enterprises, primarily cattle 
ranching. The region in which the municipality Anapú is located belongs to the latter type of 
area. From the mid-1970ies onwards, Federal Government conceded lands on the basis of so 
called alienation contracts (Contratos de Alienação de Terras Públicas) to ranchers. The 
recipients often did not physically occupy the land, giving way to occupation by others. 
Spontaneous settlement by landless people occurred alongside occupancy of the area by other 
ranchers or loggers. A tenurial chaos evolved, which facilitated the illegal acquisition of 
public lands. Land conflicts ensued. Analyses conducted by the national land reform agency 
INCRA in 1980 and 1981 found that many of the alienation contracts did not comply with the 
regulations stipulated therein and requested to devolve the land to federal jurisdiction. In this 
context, the social movements began struggling for secure land rights for Anapú’s peasant 
population. Only in 1996, INCRA began to create the first settlement projects (projetos de 
assentamento). Lack of support to implementation made these projects fail leading to distress 
sales of land. Ensuing disappointment with the traditional settlements led the social 
movements to search for a different agrarian reform modality. At the end of the 1990ies, the 
proposal to create PDS emerged as a potential solution to this impasse. This modality foresees 
individual lots and a large consecutive area, which harbours primary forest to be managed 
jointly. The assumption being that timber will serve as an economic basis for the settlers. In 
2002, INCRA created the PDS Anapú I and II (known as PDS Esperança) and PDS III and IV 
(referred to as PDS Virola-Jatobá). However, the respective areas were still occupied by 
ranchers and loggers who took legal action against INCRA. The PDS’ demarcation did not 
take place leaving the smallholder population living in the area under the very same 
conditions than before the creation of the PDS. Despites of this new disappointment, their 
struggle continued until 2005, when first steps were taken to implement the PDS. 
 
The long history of mobilisation for land rights regularisation in Anapú rests on a broad 
alliance of social movements. The key entities within the alliance are the rural labour union of 
Anapú, the pastoral land commission (Comissão Pastoral de Terra, CPT), and the Catholic 
Church of Anapú. The members of these entities have close ties within the communities. 
These well established contacts lead to a high degree of mobilisation within the communities 
living in the area subject to land rights regularisation. A very prominent person in this 
mobilisation was Sister Dorothy Stang, a nun originating from the United States naturalized 
Brazilian who worked for the rights of peasants since the opening of the Transamazon 
highway.  
 
Her assassination on February 12, 2005 and the death threats she has been exposed to serve as 
a starting point for the analysis of the strategies of the opponents to reform. In all five cases 
described above, land rights regularisation begins with the organisation of smallholders and 
awareness raising efforts. These activities depend on members of the social movement 
visiting the communities on a regular basis. In the course of this mobilisation some 
representatives of the social movements become more exposed than others. This happens 
primarily because of the positions they assume in the movements. The president of a rural 
labour union and the president of an association of inhabitants (associação dos moradores) 
are examples. Leading representatives (or their family members) of the social movements 
involved in the quest for land rights regularisation suffered from death threats in all five cases. 
Sometimes, threats were even voiced in the municipal chambers by council members, 
displayed publicly on placards, or even distributed by radio. In most of the cases the threats 
intensified after first steps towards land rights regularisation were achieved. In the example of 
Porto de Moz, threats intensified after the “Fechamento do Rio.” To understand the danger of 
such a threat, it is necessary to take into account the judicial and public security situation in 
which they occur. From 1972 to 2005, 772 assassinations occurred in the context of land 
conflicts. In only three of these cases were those ordering the assassinations (mandante) 
finally judged upon (Sauer 2005, 43ff). Further, analyses of the role of the military police – 
the police under the jurisdiction of the state of Pará – in land conflicts find that its members 
often act on behalf of those committing the crimes (Treccani 2001, 264ff). The investigation 
into the assassination of Sister Dorothy confirms this general finding for the case of Anapú 
(Senado Federal. Comissao Externa "Dorothy Stang" 2005). The day before her assassination, 
Dorthy Stang sought support by the police to enter the PDS. This support was not granted. 
Death threats limit the outreach of representatives of social movements. In the case of Porto 
de Moz, prominent members of the social movements did not leave their houses anymore 
after 5 o’clock in the afternoon. 
 
In the cases of Porto de Moz and Prainha, destruction of social movement’s property 
accompanied violence against persons or the threat of it. In both cases, small motorboats 
essential to reach the communities were destroyed. In Prainha, the building of the association 
of fishermen was set on fire. Due to their limited financial capacities and the difficulty in 
replacing much needed infrastructure, actions such as these can severely restrict the ability of 
the social movements to realise their activities. 
 
There is a further challenge to mobilisation within the municipal political context. Municipal 
politicians are o
The municipal administration – the state’s representation closest to the smallholders – in these 
circumstances does not defend smallholders’ rights. Apart from the omission to protect 
smallholders’ rights to land and forest, members of municipal administrations openly acted 
against land rights regularisation. Municipal administrations are often a key employer in 
Amazonian rural municipalities. In the cases analysed here, leading officials within the 
administration used this position to exert pressure on their employees. This practice proved to 
be an effective way to influence public opinion against agrarian reform. Members of 
municipal councils also openly acted against land rights regularisation. After the “Fechamento 
do Rio” council members were among the group which tried to lynch the co-ordinator of the 
Comitê do Desenvolvimento Sustentável de Porto de Moz. The investigation of the 
assassination of Dorothy Stang finds that the hypothesis that there was a net of supporters of 
the one ordering the assassination is “nearly unrejectable” (Senado Federal. Comissao Externa 
"Dorothy Stang" 2005, 32). The report identifies a key public official as a member of this net 
of supporters. The influence of economic elites within the federal environmental agency 
IBAMA and the land rights agency INCRA made smallholders’ position even more difficult. 
It often restricted smallholder’s ability of accessing Government organs other than municipal 
administrations to call for protection of their rights.  
 
Dependency relationships between municipal administrations and smallholders were another 
challenge to mobilisation. The absence of public services characterises large areas of the 
municipalities covered by this paper. Under these circumstances, the allocation of a service – 
such as the building of a school or the installation of a generator – serve to establish ties 
between public officials and recipient families. These ties make mobilisation for land rights 
regularisation a difficult task. If members of municipal administrations oppose agrarian 
reform, smallholders fear that support to agrarian reform would leave them without access to 
the little services they have.  
 
Dependency also characterises relationships between private agents and smallholders. 
Particularly in areas very distant to the municipal centres, ranchers or loggers are the only 
agents, who are in a position to offer some services to the communities. This might 
encompass activities like taking an ill family member to a hospital, job offers (for example, 
guard or employee in a sawmill), or the distribution of working material otherwise difficult to 
obtain. In exchange, the private agent offering the service can access natural resources such as 
the timber located on the land pertaining to a smallholder. A statement of a civil society 
member of Anapú describes this type of relationship: “The lack of a street, the lack of a 
agricultural production policy, the lack of a credit policy for smallholders, (…) in this desert 
there, in this abandoned place (…). He [a smallholder] needs to have his land cleared. In 
exchange, he gives away the timber located on his lot.” The extent to which private agents can 
operate to their liking provide another indication of the degree to which the state is only 
sporadically present in rural areas. Within the area that will eventually be covered by the PDS 
Ademir Federicci the logging company operating in the area put up a gate restricting access to 
the community Pontal. Similar to the situation described above dependency of smallholders 
on private agents turns mobilisation into a challenging task. One, it facilitates co-optation of 
smallholders by loggers or ranchers. The absence of the state combined with the option of 
support by smallholders presents a strong argument in favour of co-operation with loggers or 
ranchers. Mobilisation within a community, in which a respected member forcefully argues 
against land rights regularisation, becomes very difficult. Second, several members of the 
social movements commented that families living in regions characterised by a strong 
presence of these actors are very receptive to their reasoning. The assessment “Where we 
[member of a social movement] need hundred words, they [member of the economic elite] 
need one word” captures this tendency. In this context, spread of misinformation was a 
frequently applied strategy. Opponents of land rights regularisation told inhabitants that they 
would not be allowed to plant their fields or to raise chicken or own dogs. They coined the 
term “settlement of hunger” (assentamento de fome) to describe the modalities for land rights 
regularisation. Third, as in the case of the relationship between smallholders and municipal 
politicians, smallholders fear loosing access to the limited support systems offered by these 
agents. 
 
Further, these dependency relationships can lead to a situation, in which smallholders attribute 
a positive role to the agents exploiting resources pertaining to the community. The statement 
of one of my interview partners in the community Pontal (area destined for the PDS Ademir 
Federicci) is illustrative in this regard. Despite of the fact that the logger operating the 
sawmill exploits the valuable timber species in the area11 and forecloses access to timber and 
land by smallholders living in the area, he stated, “the sawmill is like our father.” Members of 
social movements in other cases confirmed this kind of attitude for the areas they are working 
in. Mobilisation for institutional change in these contexts becomes a challenging task.  
 
                                                 
11 See Godar (2008) for an analysis of the extent of selective timber extraction. 
Besides counteracting mobilisation efforts of the social movements, there is another strategy 
that opponents to land rights regularisation employed. My respondents referred to it as 
“making the settlement unviable” (inviabilização do assentamento). This strategy implies the 
increased harvest of valuable timber or the creation of large deforested areas. Based on the 
analysis of satellite images, Velásquez, Villas Boas, et al. (2006, 1066) find that in 
comparison to the 2002-2004 period deforestation in the RESEX Riozinho do Anfrísio 
increased for about 200% in the 2004/05 deforestation period. That is the period shortly 
before the RESEX was decreed. 
 
In summary, analyses of smallholders and social movements’ endeavours to mobilise for 
institutional change point at two challenges they needed to overcome. One, economic elites 
often exert strong influence over municipal politics. Municipal administrations, under these 
circumstances, become allies of those agents opposing reform. Support to acknowledge 
peasant’s property claims by the representation of the state closest to them becomes 
unattainable. Second, dependency relationships between smallholders and loggers or ranchers 
frequently occur. This exacerbates problems of mobilisation, as smallholders within these 
relationships rely on those agents, who appropriate resources pertaining to them. 
 
4.2 Taking the Struggle to Other Arenas: The Link to the National Level 
 
Mobilisation of communities and submission of a request for land rights regularisation are 
necessary steps. In the cases reviewed, they did not prove to be sufficient, because the 
responsible state entities receive a large amount of requests and are only able to respond to a 
few of them at a given point in time. Smallholders therefore need to draw attention to their 
particular request.  
 
Given the Transamazon highway region’s history of abandon, the social movements also have 
a history of trying to hold Government accountable. A pivotal organisation in establishing the 
links to federal level entities is the Fundação Viver, Produzir, Preservar (Foundation Live, 
Produce, Preserve)12 the judiciary representation of the Movimento Pelo Desenvolvimento da 
Transamazônica e Xingu (Movement for the Development of the Transamazon and Xingu). 
The foundation serves as an umbrella foundation for several social movements in the region. 
                                                 
12 The focus on the FVPP does not intend to undervalue other civil society organisations. Paper highlights the 
FVPP because of its importance in the region where the case studies are located. Other regional centres with a 
well-organised civil society in Western Pará are Marabá and Santarém. 
Among them are, for example, the regional federation of smallholders FETAGRI. In trying to 
make Government act within in the region the FVPP employed several means. Public events 
the so-called “Outcry of the Transamazon” (Grito da Transamazônica) or “Outcry of the 
Land” (Grito da Terra) were one instrument. Besides calling for attention these events 
intended to achieve a participatory discussion with public officials on areas such as education, 
health, agricultural production, or smallholders’ land rights. Another means to make 
Government entities act were reports made to them on illicit land use practices or the 
precarious situation in which many smallholders find themselves. In the year 1999, the Grito 
already called for the creation of Conservation Units and other modalities for land rights 
regularisation to counteract the illicit resource use practices prevailing in the region. From 
2002 onwards, the FVPP together with the Pastoral Land Commission focused on the 
implementation of the RESEX Verde para Sempre, the PDS in Anapú and the mosaic of 
conservation units in the Terra do Meio. 
 
To voice their claims at other administrative tiers, the social movements drew on their close 
ties with Brazil’s Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT). Many members of the 
social movements are at the same time PT party members. Members to congress and to the 
state assembly of Pará defended land rights regularisation in parliament and assisted in 
establishing contacts with officials in the administration. In particular after the election of 
President Lula da Silva (Brazil’s first president who is a member of the PT) PT politicians 
served as intermediator between members of the social movements and public officials.  
 
In 2002, the regional movements acquired a new partner. The Federal Ministry of 
Environment contracted ISA to conduct the aforementioned study on a mosaic of 
conservation units to be implemented in the Terra do Meio. Based in Brasília and São Paulo, 
ISA had already well-established contacts to politicians and public officials. Further, 
international environmental NGOs intensified their activities in the region from 2000 
onwards. An example is the involvement of the Environmental Defence Fund in the 
discussion on the mosaic of conservation units in the Terra do Meio. Further, Greenpeace 
conducted two studies that demonstrate the extent of illegal resource use practices and the 
violations of human rights and environmental legislation (Greenpeace 2001; Greenpeace 
2003a). Translated into English, accompanied by an annex on the link between illegal logging 
in Pará and timber consumption in the USA (Greenpeace 2004), and distributed via the 
Internet national and international repercussion followed their publication. The study 
commissioned by the MMA and conducted by ISA further confirmed the findings described 
in the studies published by Greenpeace. The increasing involvement of environmental NGOs 
coincided with the approval of the National System of Conservation Units in 2000 (Sistema 
Nacional de Unidades de Conservação). This law encompasses so-called sustainable use 
Conservation Units (such as Extractive Reserves) acknowledging collective use rights hold by 
communities within these Conservation Units. This involvement of environmental NGOs 
increased the outreach of smallholder’s claims. Further, these NGOs had the financial means 
to protect some of the more exposed members of the social movements by moving them from 
their home municipalities to a different locality. However, environmental NGOs also 
influenced the selection of the modality for land rights regularisation. Whereas the proposal to 
create an Extractive Reserve received substantial support by the involved NGO, in the case of 
Porto de Moz, the proposal formulated by communities to create so-called communal areas 
did not advance (Medina, Pokorny et al. 2009). The influence of environmental NGOs also 
extends to priority given to initiatives located in the Terra do Meio. My interview partners 
commented that the RESEX Riozinho de Anfrísio was selected as a priority area, because of 
the integrity of the forest.  
 
Social movements did not only count on support by non-governmental entities. A member of 
the “Ministério Público Federal,” a federal ministry hosting state attorneys responsible for 
ensuring that federal laws are applied properly, supported land rights regularisation.  
 
4.3 Momenta of Responsiveness: Government Responses vis-à-vis 
Smallholders’ Demands 
 
Land rights regularisation initiatives do not necessarily progress up to the state of 
implementation even though all the necessary preparatory steps are finalised. Often, this is 
attributed to insufficient financial resources. Besides the lack of financial means hindering 
implementation, there is scope for political influence on the implementation of land rights 
regularisation. According to a figure devolved by The Economist (2009) the group of 
agricultural lobbyists (so-called “bancada ruralista”) comprises 20 – 25% of members to 
national congress. This group has a history of impeding progressive land policies in Brazil (cf. 
Mendes 1992). A recent example is the discussion on the alteration of the limits of the 
National Forest Bom Futuro in Rondônia. According to Millikan and Monteiro (2009), its size 
is being reduced to cater for the needs of regional politicians illegally operating in this area. 
 There are two principal routes for influencing decisions on land rights regularisation on the 
national level. One, there is the party affiliation of leading public officials within the agencies 
responsible for implementation of the agrarian reform initiative. Second, proposals to create a 
RESEX have to follow a consultative process within Government. This opens up ways for 
political influence. In the cases RESEX Verde para Sempre and Renascer, transfer of land 
from the jurisdiction of the state of Pará to the jurisdiction of federal entities further increases 
complexity of land rights regularisation.  
 
The case Renascer demonstrates how this kind of political influence can play out to the 
detriment of smallholder’s property claims. In November 2006, one month before he had to 
hand over Government to the recently elected Ana Júlia of the PT, that time Governor of Pará 
Simão Jatene intended to create two state conservation units in the area claimed by 
proponents of the RESEX Renascer. The type of conservation unit chosen would have 
permitted the continuation of the prevailing resource use practices in the area. Among the 
political allies of Jatene is one of the largest logging companies operating in the region. Upon 
an intervention by the Ministério Público Federal the proposal was halted by a judiciary 
sentence in January 2007. Even the change in Government to a party with stronger ties with 
the social movements of the region did not accelerate the process of land rights regularisation. 
PT in Pará relies on a coalition with the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro 
(PMDB), whose politicians are often linked to the interests of the logging and ranching sector. 
Members of the social movement of Prainha commented that they did not receive much 
support from members of the PT for their quest for land rights regularisation at the end of 
2006. They attributed this little support to the fact that there were election times and large 
logging companies operating in the area.13 The preparatory studies for the RESEX Renascer 
were finalised in December 2007 and the process was transferred for the president’s approval 
in May 2008 (Instituto Socioambiental 2008). It took until June 2009 to finally create the 
RESEX. This delay occurred irrespective of the fact the judiciary sentence of January 2007 
foresaw a period of 30 days for the creation of the RESEX Renascer. When it was finally 
created, its size has been reduced about 50% excluding the area in the south of the RESEX 
harbouring a large consecutive area of primary forest. 
 
                                                 
13 A later supervision mission by IBAMA confirmed the extent of logging activity and the degree of its illegality 
(Instituto Brasileiro de Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis 2010). 
The political context was different for the RESEX Verde para Sempre and Riozinho do 
Anfrísio before the federal and state elections of 2006. After the election of Lula da Silva in 
2002 many politicians, who have a personal history of working within Brazil’s social 
movements assumed leading positions within the administration. Marina Silva, a former 
colleague of Chico Mendes in the quest for land rights regularisation in the state of Acre 
became Minister of the Environment. The head of the secretary of the Amazon and the co-
ordinator of the secretariat of “agroextractivismo”14 have personal ties to leading members of 
the social movement in Altamira. President Lula himself received members of the social 
movement of Pará to discuss their concerns. In effect, public officials within the organs got 
proactively involved in the creation of the two RESEX. 
 
Advances in the regularisation of smallholders’ land in Anapú occurred after the assassination 
of Sister Dorothy Stang. Deployment of the army, heavy presence of the Federal Policy, and 
other organs such as IBAMA and INCRA followed her killing. This led to the eviction of 
logging companies from the area and the enforcement of human rights and environmental 
legislation in the municipality. Members of the social movement of Anapú commented that 
the two PDS were de facto created after her killing. Among other steps in the implementation 
of the two PDS, two land parcels subject to judiciary decision in the PDS Virola-Jatobá were 
judged upon in favour of the settler population after the homicide. 
 
President Lula’s first term in Government (2003 – 2006) and the increasing influence of the 
social movements represent a momemtum of responsiveness for smallholder’s claims. The 
assassination of Dorothy Stang – despicable as the crime is – and the following national and 
international outcry had a similar effect. The political negotiations in 2006 did not open up 
political space to respond to smallholder’s claims. Fundamental advances in smallholder’s 
access to land and other natural resources require momenta of responsiveness by Government. 
The case of Medicilândia demonstrates the necessity of mobilisation for institutional change, 
which is easier to achieve when several social movements operate together. Contrasting the 
case of Riozinho do Anfrísio with the other successful agrarian reform initiatives, the decisive 
role that civil society organisations external to the communities can assume. Despite of low 
levels of community organisation before the inception of land rights regularisation, the 
initiative was nevertheless successful. Table 5-2 summarises the description of the phases and 
the factors influencing institutional change.  
                                                 
14 The term refers to the activities practised by traditional people, whose livelihoods partly depend on extractive 
activities. 
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Table 5-2: Factors influencing the process of institutional change in the five case studies. (+) signifies that a 
factor was present, (-) that it was not.  
 
 
5 Navigating the Sources of Power in Institutional Change:  
A Discussion 
 
This section analyses the trajectories of the five land rights regularisation initiatives applying 
the conceptual map of power outlined earlier. Presentation of analysis follows the outline of 
phases suggested in section 5.4: mobilisation for institutional change, taking the struggle to 
other arenas and momenta of responsiveness orient analysis’ presentation. The thesis is that 
smallholders occupy a marginalised social and political position, power created by the 
allocation of social positions. Overcoming this situation not only necessitates mobilisation for 
institutional change but also alliances with other agents to take their struggle to other arenas. 
Environmental NGOs were decisive in this regard. The operation of this type of organisation, 
their acknowledgement by public authorities and the Brazilian public is interpreted as power 
created by discourse. Finally, returning to the conceptualisation of causality, section shows 
the contingency of institutional change. In the absence of momenta of responsiveness, 
otherwise favourable conditions are insufficient to bring about fundamental advances in the 
recognition of smallholders’ property claims. In terms of the role of power in institutional 
change, the argument is that change occurred because of agents drawing on very different 
sources of power; sources of power that cannot be coherently theorised from an individualist 
perspective. In the following paragraphs land rights regularisation is conceptualised as a 
process of institutional change. The institution under analysis is property rights. Explanations 
refer to the different sources of power as influences on the processes of institutional change or 
stalemate. 
 
At the beginning of the process of institutional change, smallholders and social movements 
needed to mobilise for change. A key obstacle is the influence of ranchers and loggers on 
decisions taken within municipal administrations. Actions by the police in favour of those 
violating legislation or support to those practicing illicit resource use strategies are outcomes 
of this influence. Through their ties with the municipal administration and other public 
authorities, economic elites operating in the municipality acquire a social position that allows 
them to use natural resources as they do. Smallholders, to the contrary, cannot call upon 
municipal administrations to enforce their rights. Smallholders and economic elites occupy 
social positions that are emergent properties of the relations in which they are embedded. 
These social positions are interdependent. Due to economic elites preferential access to 
municipal administrations, smallholders occupy a marginalised position in municipal politics.  
 
Further obstacles to mobilisation for institutional change arise because of the dependency of 
smallholders on loggers or ranchers for the acquisition of goods or services, which they 
cannot obtain on their own. This dependency relationship is constitutive of another social 
structure, which I will refer to as clientelism here. A clientelistic relation can be defined as an 
asymmetric reciprocity relationship between individuals or groups of different economic, 
social, or political standing (Powell 1970; Scott 1972). Through the institutional setting 
constituting clientelism, the economic elites obtain a social position, which facilitates 
influencing the decisions taken by smallholders. This creates additional obstacles to 
mobilisation.  
 
There is a further aspect to social structures as a source of power. Clientelistic relationships 
prevail in much of rural Pará. Their history dates back to the beginnings of Amazonian 
colonisation. The debt peonage system established by the early rubber barons is one example 
(Bunker 1984). Further, clientelism is a ubiquitous phenomenon in the rural areas from which 
many of the migrants moving to the Amazon originate (such as Maranhão) (Roniger 1987). It 
is therefore likely that many of the smallholders were socialised within clientelistic 
relationships. Embedded social rules like those associated with clientelism can induce 
habitual behaviour. As shown above, habitual behaviour can be a significant source of 
smallholder’s disempowerment or, vice versa, of the power of their patrons. The findings 
presented above and the historical embeddedness of clientelistic relationships and the rural 
Amazon suggest that the opponents of land right regularisation could draw on this source of 
power in their attempts at maintaining the status quo. 
 
The combined influence of these social structures (ties between municipal economic elites 
and municipal administrations and clientelism) leaves smallholders in an over-determined 
social position, as the two social structures reinforce the social position allocated to 
smallholders by each of them. Successful mobilisation for institutional change demonstrates 
that the over-determined position, which is further sustained by habitual behaviour of some, is 
not cast in stone. Those arguing for institutional change were able to convince fellow 
smallholder of the benefits of land rights regularisation. They were able to jointly reflect on 
their position and achieve a joint understanding of the need of land rights regularisation. In 
the cases of the RESEX this is most clearly evidenced by the democratic decision in favour of 
creating the reserve, which forms part of the legal requirements for creating a RESEX. Those 
arguing for land rights regularisation also achieved joint action in favour of land rights 
regularisation. The “Fechamento do Rio” and the resistance by the settlers in Virola-Jatobá 
after its official creation in 2002 despite of the level of violence and intimidation they 
experienced are examples in this regard. Notwithstanding their marginalised position, 
smallholders retain their agency, their ability to reflect on the current position and to 
prospectively formulate other courses of action (cf. Emirbayer and Mische 1998; Bromley 
2006; Schmidt 2008). Collective action by smallholders in this context is about recognition of 
their rights vis-à-vis other agents by the state (cf. Johnson 2004, 418). It is a means in a 
distributive conflict. The cases reviewed here suggest that achievements in land rights 
regularisation demand this type of collective action. 
 
On municipal level, opponents to reform drew on another agential source of social power: 
coercion through violence or the threat of it. It is a tactic applied in all the case reviewed. 
There is an aspect to coercion worth emphasizing, its relation to the social structural context 
in which they occur. It is questionable whether death threats would be an equally forceful 
means, if Pará more assassins and their “mandantes” would be convicted. Impunity of 
homicides – in particularly of those ordering the crime – is a fertile ground for death threats or 
their execution. 
 
In taking the struggle to other arenas, social movements drew on established ties with the PT 
and build new alliances with environmental NGOs. Both relationships allow social 
movements to gain access to people or fora otherwise foreclosed. In the conceptualisation 
offered here, this access represents an emergent property of a social structure. Representatives 
of smallholder movements acquire a social position (which provides access to public officials) 
by entering a relationship with another type of agent. Apart from power created by the 
allocation of social positions, there is another important source of power that comes into play 
in taking the struggle to other arenas: discourses. In the cases discussed here, discourses are a 
source of power in two ways. First, the environmental discourse and Brazilian and 
international concerns regarding environmental destruction within the Amazon provide the 
context in which environmental NGOs operate. Schmink and Wood (1992, 16) observe a 
general “greening of the discourse” in the Amazon. The United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro 1992 gave rise to the Government of 
Brazil’s Pilot Programme to Conserve the Amazon and the Atlantic Rainforests of Brazil. 
Acknowledgement of the necessity of environmental protection by parts of the Brazilian 
society provides justification for environmental NGOs’ operations in the Amazon. Discourses 
provide legitimacy to the operation of these entities that are crucial mediators in social 
movements attempt at making their claims heard at other administrative tiers. That is, in 
building their alliances social movements drew on discourses as a source of power. In Porto 
de Moz, this led to a situation, in which the form of land rights regularisation developed by 
the smallholders themselves (the community areas) was replaced with Extractive Reserves as 
a modality for land rights regularisation. The latter land rights regularisation modality 
foresees more influence of IBAMA on resource use decisions by the inhabitants of the area. 
From the point of view of smallholders, alliances with environmental NGOs can have 
unintended consequences (cf. Medina, Pokorny et al. 2009). Second, environmental 
discourses allowed phrasing smallholder’s property claims in environmental terms.15 Alluding 
to their “sustainable” resource use practices, their way of managing resources appears as one 
solution to the global policy concern tropical deforestation. The ability to link one’s 
                                                 
15 Both modalities for land rights regularisation have an environmental protection component. Extractive 
Reserves are a type of conservation unit recognised by the Brazilian System of Conservation Units. Sustainable 
Development Projects are a type of settlement project that intend to sustainably and collectively use 80% of the 
settlement area (on the history of the PDS modality, see Greenpeace 2007). 
expressions with well-established discourses (interdiscusivity) enhances the probability that 
these expressions are taken up and lead to institutional change (cf. Phillips, Lawrence et al. 
2004, 644f). In smallholder’s struggle for recognition, environmental discourses enhanced 
their ability to link their property claims to global concerns. They were a means in taking their 
struggle to other arenas and, hence, a further source of power smallholders drew on. 
 
The conceptual map of power set out by suggesting a generative view of causality as a useful 
basis for conceptualisation of power. The generative view of causality highlights that social 
entities possess causal powers irrespective of whether they are exercised at a given moment. 
Social entities with their causal powers co-exist and their joint operation causes events. 
Whether entity’s causal powers lead to an event is contingent upon other entities with their 
causal powers operating at the same time. This co-existence of objects with their causal 
powers offer an explanation of the dependence of recognition of smallholder’s property 
claims by the state on what I refer to as “momenta of responsiveness.” The cases suggest that 
it needs extraordinary circumstances to break the influence of the logging and ranching 
sectors on political decisions regarding the distribution of land taken in Brasília. In the 
absence of momenta of responsiveness the RESEX Renascer suffered from severe reductions 
in its size. This is not without historical precedence. The creation of the first Extractive 
Reserves in the state of Acre followed the assassination of Chico Mendes and the ensuing 
national and international uproar (Silva 1994). In this context, it is also worth remembering 
that the decision against altering the agrarian structure in Southern and Northeastern Brazil 
stood at the outset of the colonisation of the Amazon in the 1970ies. There is not only 
historical precedent; there are also similar contemporary processes in different localities. The 
case of the Flona Bom Futuro provides an example from Rondônia (cf. Millikan and Monteiro 
2009). 
 
There are two concluding comments to this discussion. First, the strategies of opponents and 
proponents of reform highlight that power also has a material basis. Without the necessary 
financial means, to give a deliberately simple example, printing and distribution of pamphlets 
becomes impossible. The distribution of material benefits is not only an epiphenomenon to 
institutions or discourses; it becomes a source of power in its own right. Second, concerning 
the sources of power after the creation of the RESEX and the PDS. Recognition of 
smallholder’s property claims by the State implies that the state assumes responsibility to 
protect smallholders claims once contested. Smallholders become rights holder. This social 
position arises because of the state assuming its responsibility vis-à-vis the smallholder 
population. That is, the state assumes a facilitating role in creating the necessary conditions 






This paper set out suggesting that analyses of processes that create the necessary conditions 
for communal resource governance can be quite different from those processes of institutional 
change highlighted by “collective-action scholarship.” The five cases reviewed in this paper 
support this assessment. Fierce distributive – and often violent – conflicts replace self-
organisation for the collective benefit as a driver of institutional change. Institutional change 
needed to begin in a context characterised by resource use decisions dominated by economic 
elites well entrenched in municipal politics. This elite – to only comment on one of the 
characteristics of users conducive to self-governance as outlined by Ostrom (cf. 1999) – is not 
dependent on forest conditions in a particular locality. Valuable timber can be logged 
elsewhere in the Brazilian Amazon and standing forest only impedes cattle raising. To the 
extent that those benefitting from these illicit activities live in other parts of Brazil and are 
able to reinvest profits in other economic activities (Repórter Brasil 2008), salience on the 
resource is even further reduced. There is a further comment regarding the role of the state 
within self-governance of common pool resources. Within “collective action scholarship” the 
state often appears as an agent who restricts collective action by resource users (Ostrom 
2005b). This paper’s findings, to the contrary, show that the state can assume an essential 
facilitating role in making collective resource governance possible. This is not to say that 
collective resource governance by its users is impossible. But the cases highlight that a sole 
focus on collective resource governance without a description of the processes that create the 
enabling conditions runs the risk of producing a misleading picture of what is at stake when 
marginalised segments of the rural society are to become holders of rights over valuable 
natural resources. 
 
The paper further suggests to approach processes of institutional change that are at the core of 
this paper through an agrarian perspective focusing on the distribution of power and the social 
relations between the different societal groups. This perspective allows an explanation of the 
smallholders’ marginalised position within the rural society. Moreover a focus on the 
different sources of power permit an explanation of how smallholders overcame this 
marginalised position. The conceptual map of power proves useful in explaining institutional 
change. With this conceptual frame and its application to the cases, the paper also questions 
narrow methodological individualist conceptualisations of power. A relational approach to 
power offered by an agrarian perspective offers a more fruitful basis for a conceptualisation of 
power (cf. Isaac 1992).  
 
Concerning agrarian change in the Brazilian Amazon and the prospects of broader access to 
natural resources by its smallholder population, the cases reviewed here caution optimism. It 
needed a wide array of factors to bring about institutional change. Their replicability in all 
those localities in need of land rights regularisation is unlikely. Overcoming smallholders’ 
political and social marginalisation requires challenging deep-rooted social relations. As 
Borras and Franco (2010, 23) observe, “the rural poor and their allies are confronted by the 
challenge to change their situation with the very structures that perpetuate their problematic 
conditions.” This is the very situation, in which Amazonian smallholders find themselves. 
 
The paper also contributes to a discussion on the role of environmental movements within this 
struggle. From smallholder’s points of view alliances with these groups can yield ambiguous 
outcomes. On the one hand, alliances with environmental NGOs offer leverage and links to 
other arenas essential to progress with land rights regularisation. On the other hand, 
environmental NGOs have their own objectives, which they try to achieve through this 
alliance. As the case of community areas shows, environmental movements are more 
powerful than the communities when it comes to deciding on modalities for land rights 
regularisation (Medina, Pokorny et al. 2009). 
 
I doubt that the results of this paper come as particularly surprising ones to scholars of 
agrarian change. I hope, however, to contribute to a critical appraisal of communal resource 
governance (cf. Campbell, Mandondo et al. 2001). Last but not least, this critical appraisal is 
necessary from a policy point of view. Some of “collective action scholarship’s” results are 
presented in a manner which makes them susceptible to policy uptake (cf. Mollinga 2001). 
“Collective action scholarship’s” conceptualisation of natural resource management already 
influences what donor agencies think (for example, IFAD 2001, 187ff) and do about forest 
management (cf. Sunderlin 2006). If translated too easily into development policy, the lack of 
attention to power and distributive conflicts might also characterise policy initiatives and 
“development projects.” Policies or “development projects” building on an apolitical 
conceptualisation of resource governance might already imply substantial risks for the 
communities involved. Furthermore, development policy is frequently driven by fashion (see, 
Rauch 1996b for an example on participation). Its changes in policy prescriptions often 
resemble pendulum swings rather than amendments to the course. Inattention to the 
limitations of “collective action scholarship” might then lead to a situation in which “the baby 
communal resource governance may be thrown away with the bathing water” in the future. 
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